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2Stabilization and Growth under Dictatorship:
The Experience of Franco’s Spain
Introduction
Since the early 1980s, many developing countries have undergone major economic
policy reforms following the so-called “Washington Consensus”. These reforming
programmes usually include measures conducive to trade and capital account liberalization,
macroeconomic policies to reduce inflation and the size of the fiscal imbalances, and other
reforms to protect private property rights and to reduce the activity of the government.1 Until
recently, most academics and policy-makers would agree that such economic policies have
the potential to be growth-promoting and alleviate poverty. What the historical experience has
shown, however, is that in many occasions such major political changes had failed in their
ultimate objectives causing weak, unintended, or negative outcomes. Empirical studies, based
on cross-country regressions, offer, also, contradictory results on the alleged benefits of the
implementation of these reforms.2 Different initial conditions and circumstances provoked
disparate results of apparently identical policies.3
The Spanish stabilization programme of 1959 could be considered as an historical
precedent of the measures contained in the Washington Consensus. After the Civil War, the
new authorities relied on the coercive power of the state and tried to guide the economy
through the enactment of widespread controls. In the early 1950s after the U.S.-Spanish
agreements, many of the previous regulations were relaxed and the government began a
cautious liberalization process. During the 1950s, growth rates accelerated on the basis of
capital accumulation and efficiency gains.4 Nonetheless, it is commonly recognized that, by
1 This set of policies was labelled by Williamson (1990) the “Washington Consensus”. See Fischer
(2003) and, more recently, Schleifer (2009) and Edwards (2009).
2 In the assessment of the impact of policy reforms on growth an alternative approach, to cross-country
panel regressions is provided by individual country studies in which major policy reforms are
identified and economic performance before and after they were implemented, examined. See, for
example, Fisher (1993). Sachs and Warner (1995) and Easterly (2005).
3 The literature analysing the consequences of national economic policies on growth and poverty is
substantial. See, recent reviews, of Easterly (2005) and De Haan et al (2006).
4 See Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2009). Calvo-González (2007) has underlined the importance
of the improvement in economic agents’ expectations, resulting from the U.S.-Spain cooperation
agreements of 1953, for growth recovery during the 1950s. See also, Guirao (1998).
3the late 1959, an untenable economic situation, in particular, the shortage of foreign reserves,
forced the dictatorship to renew its economic policy drastically. A new government of
technocrats introduced a simultaneous liberalization of domestic markets and international
economic relations. Following IMF and OEEC advice, a conventional stabilization
programme was enforced containing measures on inflation, public spending, and market
liberalization.5 Soon macroeconomic stability was achieved by reducing inflation and the
budget deficit. In addition to a more orthodox macroeconomic policy, Spain adhered to major
international organizations constraining government’s ability to violate international
commitments to economic liberalization. Apparently, economic agents reacted positively to
the new stimulus and economic growth accelerated dramatically up to 1975.
Spanish experience provides a good historical test for the effectiveness of the ‘basic’
set of Washington Consensus’ policies under dictatorship, adding a long-run dimension which
is missing in the ongoing debate on the consequences of liberalization and stabilization
programs.6 Our main goal is, then, to test the widespread claim that the new policies
associated to the 1959 Plan of Stabilization and Liberalization had a dramatic impact on
Spain’s growth performance. To do so, we construct a new index of macroeconomic
distortions (hereafter IMD) and analyse its impact on growth in several counterfactual
scenarios.
In a nutshell, our results confirm the important role played by the 1959 Plan and the
subsequent reforms in promoting sustained economic growth while, at the same time, the role
played by the gradual reduction of macroeconomic distortions during the 1950s is
emphasized. Without the previous wave of moderate reforms, the Stabilization Plan might
have failed to be implemented. According to our calculations, without these successive
economic policy reforms GDP would have been significantly lower at the time of Franco’s
death, in 1975. More specifically, without any change in economic policy (that is, had
government maintained the distortions enforced after the Civil War). GDP per head in 1975
would have been two-thirds of its actual level (lower than in Portugal, Bulgaria, Hungary, or
5 OEEC was OECD’s forerunner. Similar stabilization plans were carried out at the time in other
European countries such as France, Portugal, or Ireland under the advice of the international
organizations See, for example, Boltho (1996).
6 See Przeworski et al. (2000) and Doucouliagos and Ulabaşoğlu (2008). The fact is that the beneficial
consequences of many policy interventions are not observable in the short-run. For example, episodes
of fiscal stabilization may cause an immediate contraction of the economy but favoured investment
and innovation in the long-run.
4Poland). and without the Stabilization Plan (but with the 1950s reforms). would have only
reached 85 percent of its actual level (still lower than in Greece, Czechoslovakia, and Ireland).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section reviews Franco’s regime
growth record and its economic policy. In section 3 we introduce our IMD which allows us to
determine major economic policy changes in Spain.7 Then, in section 4, we examine the main
determinants of growth highlighting the deterrent role played by macroeconomic distortions.
The economic costs of anti-market policies in early Francoism are considered in section 5 by
exploring alternative counterfactual scenarios. The last section concludes and suggests some
avenues for further research and policy implications.
Economic Performance and Policy during Franco’s Regime
Economic performance during General Franco’s dictatorship represents an exception
in the economic history of Modern Spain (Figure 1). Franco’s regime covered the period from
the end of the Civil War (1936-39) to the dictator’s death in 1975. A closer look reveals that,
after the contraction that resulted from the Civil War and a slow recovery during the 1940s,
per capita GDP growth intensified in the 1950s, and accelerated dramatically from the 1959
Stabilization and Liberalization Plan up to 1974.
[FIGURE 1]
In comparative perspective Spanish growth record was highly disappointing during the
early phase of Franco’s dictatorship. Per capita GDP growth between the eve of the Civil War
(1935) and 1952 was much slower (0.2 percent) than in the United States and Western Europe
between a comparable period, 1938-52 (where it grew at 3.7 and 0.9 percent, respectively). In
Spain, pre-war per capita GDP peak levels (1929) were only recovered in 1955, while by
1950 Western Europe had recovered, on average, its 1938 level of GDP per head. Such a
difference deserves to be explored in depth because, on the one hand, there was less
destruction of lives and physical capital as a consequence of Spanish Civil War than in
Western Europe during World War II (Catalan 1995, Reher 2003, Ortega and Silvestre 2006,
Prados de la Escosura and Rosés 2010a, Rosés 2009) but, on the other, an intense destruction
of human capital occurred as a result of political exile and post-war political repression
(Prados de la Escosura 2007, Prados de la Escosura and Rosés 2010b). The situation began to
change in the 1950s when the economy grew, in per capita terms, at a similar rate to the
7 Previous studies have employed similar indicators of macroeconomic policy. Cf. Fisher (1993).
Barro (1996) Durlauf et al. (2008). Prados de la Escosura and Sanz-Villarroya (2009).
5Western European average but with the significant difference that Spain started from a
substantially lower level.8 It was during the last period of Franco’s rule (1959-1975) when
growth per head reached an unprecedented intensity in Spain, not far behind 1950s Germany
and way above Western Europe and the U.S.
At first sight, significant differences in the forces behind economic growth can be
observed between the three periods mentioned above.9 In the earlier period, 1939-51, per
capita income growth (2.1 percent) depended, almost equally, on the increase in GDP per
hour worked (0.9 percent per year) and on the rise in hours worked per person (1.1 percent).
Efficiency gains explained, in turn, all the improvement in labour productivity. In the second
one, 1952-58, per capita GDP growth accelerated (4.4 percent) depending exclusively on the
increase in labour productivity (4.2 percent). which largely resulted from efficiency gains (2.7
percent). but also from capital deepening. The pattern initiated in the 1950s intensified during
1959-75, with labour productivity (6.4 percent) accounting for all the improvement in per
capita GDP (5.6 percent) while the rise in total factor productivity (4.1 percent) accounts for
two-thirds of the increase in output per hour worked.
Why the economic growth record was so disappointing during the early Franco’s rule?
Why the economy grew during the 1950s without apparently a significant transformation of
the political regime? What does account for the acceleration in Spain’s pace of growth since
1960? A casual observation underlines the relation between growth rates and the Regime’s
economic policy.
The early years of the Dictatorship -since the Civil War up to the early 1950s-
represented a dramatic rupture with economic policies prevalent in Spain since mid-19th
century. Effective possession of legislative and judicial powers gave Franco’s dictatorship the
ability to alter economic and political rights discretionally. Furthermore, the dictatorship did
not reassure economic agents of the New State’s commitment to private property and free
market. Quite the contrary, the new authorities shared a strong anti-market attitude and
proposed the subordination of the economy to politics. Not only the rhetoric of the new
8 In fact countries that experienced a reconstruction process grew at much faster pace. Such was the
case of Italy (4.9 percent) and, especially, Germany (6.5 percent). Growth rates for Spain and Western
Europe and the U.S. are computed from Prados de la Escosura (2010) and Maddison (2009).
respectively. Western Europe is a population weighted average of Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.
9 The following discussion relies on estimates from Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2009) and
background computations for this paper.
6regime was against free market but its economic policy often threatened private investment
and the development of private business (Fraile Balbín 1998). Severe market controls aiming
at economic autarky were implemented (Barciela 2002). The new state-owned enterprises
began by controlling ‘strategic’ industries seeking technical solutions to maximize the amount
of production, bypassing the opportunity cost of their decisions (Martín Aceña and Comín
1991). Labour relations were subordinated to the ‘national interest’ and employers and
workers incorporated into a single ‘vertical’ union in an attempt to harmonize diverging social
and economic interests (González 1979). This economic policy provided, in turn, an
advantageous position to those small groups and coalitions which, in exchange for support to
the dictatorship, would derive rents from the public sector and even control the state’s
economic decisions (Fraile Balbín 1999). To make the economic situation even worse,
economic agents were uncertain about how long would the regime last (Calvo-González
2001, 2007).
[FIGURE 2]
Apparently, these new economic goals required the development of a strong public
sector and an increasing budget (González 1979). However, in comparative terms, the share
of government consumption in total consumption was not particularly high during this period,
except during World War II years when military spending upsurge.10 As shown in Figure 2,
the share of government consumption had an average value of 20 percent during the early
1940s, it began to decrease during the second half of the 1940s and fell further down during
the 1950s reaching an average level of 10 percent, similar to the one prevalent before the Civil
War.
[FIGURE 3]
Although the size of the state increased, the government left public finances to
languish. Treasury did not introduce a tax reform to increase its revenues until 1957 because a
clash with interest groups supporting the Regime was feared (Díaz Fuentes 1994, Comín
1996). So, a large amount of debt was issued while a policy of low nominal interest rates was
implemented. In addition, limits to fiduciary circulation were suspended and the Bank of
Spain was given full power for proceeding with debt monetization. Under these
circumstances, monetary policy succumbed to the demands from government budget, losing
their autonomy (Martin Aceña 1994). Clearly, the potential inflationary risks of this new
10 For example, in 1944 military expenditure was more than ten times that on education (Comín and
Díaz Fuentes, 2005, table 12.18).
7monetary management were very high, since any increase in public debt could determine a
monetary expansion. In consequence, inflation rates were comparatively high during the early
Franco’s rule even though inflation was repressed through officially established prices (Figure
3). Inflation rate was, on average, 10 percent over the 1940s, decreased to 8 percent in the
1950s and, after the Stabilization measures, inflation rates practically halved, falling below 6
percent, on average, during 1959-73, and went up to 12 percent after the 1973 oil shock.
[FIGURE 4]
The Franco’s Regime also represented an exception from the point of view of Spain’s
integration in the international economy as it was initiated by a dramatic closing down
followed, then, by opening up to a historical maximum, after the stabilization plan of 1959
(Figure 4). In accordance with the new anti-trade policy, the new regime strongly regulated
foreign currency markets aiming at having absolute control of foreign trade (Martínez Ruiz
2003). The creation of the Spanish Institute for Foreign Currency (IEME), which
monopolized the deposit and trade in all currencies, deprived the Bank of Spain of the
exchange rate policy control, separating artificially the management of internal and external
monetary policy. The private possession of foreign currency was prohibited and exporters
forced to hand it over to the IEME at the official, overvalued exchange rate. The
overvaluation of the exchange rate, a matter of national pride for the Franco regime, harmed
exports and fed the desire to import. To avoid collapse, the regulation and control of currency
trade was very strict. The outcome of all these policies was a strong premium for currency
exchange in the ‘black market’ and, thus, a substantial deviation between the official and the
free market exchange rate of the Peseta.11
During the 1950s, economic interventionism was relaxed, but not suppressed, and the
international isolation Spain suffered since 1945, due to Franco alignment with the Axis
powers during World War II, began to breakdown. On the one hand, General Franco formed a
new government by July 1951 that rectified the economic strategy followed in the 1940s
(Barciela 2002). The most extreme interventionist measures on commodity markets were
relaxed and corrected. Thus, the centralized allocation of scarce goods, namely food rationing
and quotas for raw materials and energy, was abolished. Yet foreign investment continued
harshly restricted (Martínez Ruiz 2003, Viñas et al. 1979, Barciela 2002). The new
international context dominated by the Cold War helped decisively to rehabilitate the regime
11 For example, in 1941, the official exchange rate was 10.95 Peseta per U.S. Dollar but the free
exchange rate in Tangiers was 24.49 Peseta per Dollar.
8of General Franco in the international community. In November 1950, the United States
supported a vote in the U.N. General Assembly invalidating the 1946 resolution which
excluded Spain from this organization, while the Pact of Madrid (September 1953) committed
the U.S. to provide an unspecified amount of aid in return for the right to establish four
military bases in Spain (Calvo-González 2006).12 In the 1950s fast and intensive growth was
apparently facilitated by the increasing confidence of economic agents derived from the
greater political stability that followed the U.S.-Spain cooperation agreements (Calvo-
González 2007) but also by a cautious and moderate economic liberalization.
[FIGURE 5]
Reforms also arrived to the foreign exchange market. In an attempt to dampen the
negative effects of the prevalent exchange-rate policy, the authorities adopted a system of
multiple exchange rates in 1948 which lasted until July 1959. This new system was designed
to facilitate exports and imports of certain goods by applying favourable exchange rates,
hindered foreign trade and gave rise to corruption (Donges 1973, de la Dehesa 1991).
However, the multiple exchange rate system allowed the authorities to devalue surreptitiously
the peseta (Serrano Sanz and Asensio Castillo 1997). In fact, a glance at Figure 5, allows one
to observe that while the ‘black market’ premium increased between 1948 and 1956 when the
official, and practically fixed, exchange rate is considered, however, when an “effective”
official exchange rate -obtained by weighting different official exchange rates by its relative
importance within the balance of payments on current account- is used, a gradual convergence
is found between the free and the “effective” official exchange rate, with the subsequent
contraction in the ‘black market’ premium.13
In the late 1950s, clear signs of economic over-heating manifested in growing inflation
and increasing external deficit. Foreign exchange reserves, in particular, were exhausted by
mid-1959. In such circumstances, a complete economic policy reorientation represented by
12 According to Guirao (1998). U.S. financial support during the 1950s under the Pact of Madrid was
largely aimed at building U.S. military bases. However, Calvo-González (2007) points out that U.S.
financial support was extremely important because it solved one of Spain’s main bottlenecks: the lack
of hard currency with which to finance foreign trade. In any case, aid received by Spain did not have
comparable effects to be derived from the Marshall Plan to Western European countries (Prados de la
Escosura and Sanz 1996). Furthermore, Spain did not benefit of externalities which were associated to
the U.S. aid to Western Europe (De Long and Eichengreen, 1991) and was excluded from the
multilateral institutions that managed economic cooperation, trade and financial imbalances.
13 Serrano Sanz and Asensio Castillo (1997) and, especially, Martínez Ruiz (2003).
9the Stabilization and Liberalization Plan in 1959 was forced in order to prevent the collapse of
the economy. Spain opened up to major international organizations and committed to gradual
liberalization.14 Spanish presence in major international organizations was an implicit
guarantee of the definitive abandonment of isolationist options, legitimized the change in
economic policy, facilitated the arrival of foreign technical assistance, and reduced the
opposition to economic reforms from within Franco’s regime (Sardá 1970, Varela Parache
2004, Fuentes Quintana 1984, González 1979).
The 1959 Stabilization and Liberalization Plan marked the beginning of a new era in
the Spanish economy since the country entered rapidly into a process of economic
liberalization and international market integration. It contained measures in three main areas.
Firstly, a classical stabilization operation was executed with the objective of reducing
inflation, which was mainly due to a lack of monetary discipline. Public spending was
controlled, the issue of new public debt limited, and the Bank of Spain’s rate of discount
increased. Secondly, domestic markets were partly liberalised by suppressing regulations and
simplifying administrative procedures. Prices of goods (petrol, tobacco) and services
(telephone, transport) supplied by state monopolies were adjusted upwards in an attempt to
close the gap between official prices and their real provision costs. Lastly, a liberalization of
foreign economic relations was implemented (Fuentes Quintana 1984, de la Dehesa et al.
1991). In July 1959, Spanish authorities liberalized 50 percent of its trade. Eventually the
recurrent financial problems due to monetary isolation also persuaded the authorities to
rethinking the exchange-rate policy. In July 1959, and following the convertibility of major
European currencies in December 1958 (Toniolo 2005). the peseta became convertible with
major European currencies and integrated into the Bretton Woods system. This monetary
integration was accompanied by a more realistic exchange rate and the adherence to the
exchange-rate discipline of the IMF.15 As a consequence, the ‘black market’ premium for
currency exchange disappeared abruptly. Also, restrictions on foreign direct investment were
relaxed (Serrano Sanz and Pardos 2002). The IMF, OEEC, the Bank for International
14 Spain integrated successively in the International Monetary Fund (1958); World Bank (1958); the
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (1959) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (1963).
15 The national currency devalued to 60 Peseta per U.S. dollar, a rate slightly higher than the one
prevailing in black market (Martínez Ruíz, 2003).
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Settlements and several U.S. private banks provided financial coverage for the operation of
the Stabilization Plan through grants and loans in hard currency.16
All major contingency measures contained in the 1959 Plan were successful: inflation
declined, the budget deficit disappeared, and an inflow of foreign capital took place (Prados
de la Escosura and Sanz 1996). By implementing the new policy, Franco’s regime showed its
commitment to orthodox macroeconomic policies and offered a precedent of responsible
behaviour to domestic and foreign investors.
After the 1959 Plan, and accompanying the integration of Spain into international
organizations, a liberalization of foreign economic relations was implemented. Quantitative
restrictions on foreign trade were replaced with tariffs, more flexible and less distorting. Still
in early 1959, liberalized trade (that is, imports entering with the only requirement of
satisfying the tariff) was only 9 percent of total trade, while the remainder was subject to
quotas, special trade or bilateral agreements. By 1973, liberalized trade reached 80 per cent of
the total, while quotas and special trade had almost disappeared (Serrano Sanz and Pardos
2002).
The commitment to openness of Spain continued during the remaining years of
Franco’s Dictatorship (1960-1975). Integrating the peseta in the Bretton Woods system led to
its convertibility at a more realistic exchange rate. This was completed with a moderate
financial liberalization on the capital inflows in the long term, while short-term outflows were
restricted.17 Trade liberalization was gradual since the rapid decrease of quantitative
restrictions was partly counterbalanced by an increase in tariff rates (Donges 1973). However,
international commitments imposed Spain to attend the GATT negotiating rounds.18 The
preferential agreements with the European Economic Community in 1970 resulted in a new
decrease in tariffs and increases in trade quotas with member countries. Large trade
16 The total amount of grants and loans was estimated at $544 million. Furthermore, European
governments assured not to demand payments of short-term debt that Spain had incurred through
bilateral trade agreements (Calvo-González 2006).
17 This was quite common in western countries at the time and consistent with the scarce presence of
foreign banks in Spain. In addition, the system of fixed exchange rates seemed to require, in the
peripheral countries, tight exchange controls to prevent potentially destabilizing short-term speculative
operations. See, for example, Eichengreen et al. (2003).
18 In the Kennedy Round of GATT (1964-1967). Spain agreed tariff reductions that entered into force
between 1968 and 1972 (Serrano Sanz and Pardos 2002).
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imbalances were financed by foreign investment, tourism and emigrant remittances (Prados
de la Escosura and Sanz 1996, Serrano Sanz and Pardos 2002).
Simultaneously, Franco’s governments kept orthodox ideas about a balanced budget
and the control of public expenditure, while social expenditure was of little significance
(Comín 1994, Prados de la Escosura and Sanz 1996). So, during 1959-75, the share of
government spending represented on average a mere 8 percent of GDP (see Figure 3 above).
Nonetheless, social expenditures increased in the late Franco period (1960–75) and its share
in GDP (excluding education) doubled to reach 12.5 percent of GDP (Bandrés 1999).
Measuring major economic policy changes
Can we assess quantitatively these policy reforms and their impact on long-run
growth? Our strategy to deal with this challenge will be, firstly, to establish the chronology of
major economic policy changes and, then, to investigate the extent to which these policies
affected broad capital accumulation and efficiency gains.
However, a fundamental problem in analysing the impact of economic reforms is the
simultaneity and connections between distinctive policies given that they are not absolutely
independent and often are implemented simultaneously. From an econometric point-of-view,
this may cause that the different explanatory variables are correlated among them. For this
reason, we begin by constructing an index of macroeconomic distortions (hereafter IMD) for
Spain.19
The IMD index tries to capture the basic features of macroeconomic policies that
could influence economic performance while avoiding cross-correlation problems between
different policy indicators. The selection of variables compounding the index is not ad hoc
since we include those variables which seem more representative of Franco’s economic
policy.20 Specifically, the index combines, using principal components analysis, three
macroeconomic variables: the share of government consumption within national
19 Our index is related to the index of economic freedom published by the Fraser Institute since 1996
(Gwartney et al. 1996) and it is similar to the ‘reduced’ index of economic freedom developed in
Prados de la Escosura and Sanz-Villarroya (2009).
20 Furthermore, our variables closely resemble those employed by Fisher (1993). Barro (1996) and
Durlauf et al. (2008) to account for the impact of macroeconomic policy on cross-country differences
in GDP growth. However, any employs our index methodology.
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consumption,21 the depreciation rate of the currency, and the differential between the official
and the free market exchange rate (the ‘black market’ premium).22
The impact of government consumption over economic growth is under dispute as
most economists agree that the government has important tasks to perform (De Haan et al.
2006). From a free market perspective, the government should provide public goods for
which free markets do not produce efficient results. However, when governments move into
the provision of private goods, they restrict consumer choice and, hence, economic freedom.
Furthermore, governments could produce an excess of public goods damaging economic
growth. In particular, a dictatorship could produce an excess of law enforcement because of
its desire to controlling citizens behaviour.
The depreciation of the currency is also part of the index. High and volatile inflation
has a negative impact on economic growth. A high rate of inflation implies an absence of
sound money and undermines gains from trade. Moreover, it alters the fundamental terms of
long-term contracts leading to a decrease in economic confidence.23
Finally, we introduce exchange rate controls in our index. Insofar they reduce the
convertibility of currency; exchange rate controls hold back international trade, foreign
investment and private confidence in government behaviour. In particular, Chanda (2005)
shows that capital controls do have an important negative effect on economic growth. In
countries with powerful interest groups, capital controls lead to greater inefficiencies and
lower economic growth.
21 Government consumption covers government spending on goods and services (administration,
military, judicial system, etc.) while excludes, in addition to health and education expenditure, public
transfers (such as social security, unemployment benefits, and retirement pensions). and gross fixed
capital formation. In other words, it measures the part of government spending that is not devoted
directly to productive activities or to increase private consumption.
22 The reader could be intrigued by the fact that we do not include any openness measure in the IMD
index. The fact is openness is not a good measure of national economic policy because is not only
determined by government decisions but also by policies and goods demand from its trade partners.
Moreover, the ‘black market’ premium (see below) will somehow capture the degree of openness.
23 The relationship between inflation and growth has provoked an intense debate since Barro’s (1995)
seminal contribution. Economists tend to agree that a high and volatile inflation will have a negative
impact on growth, but for some authors a moderate rate of inflation is beneficial for growth (De Haan
et al. 2006).
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Once the variables to be included in the index of macroeconomic distortions (IMD)
have been chosen, the next step is to decide how to incorporate them. To do so, we have
employed factorial analysis based on the principal components method. Principal Component
Analysis (PCA hereafter) assigns weights on the basis of the distributions and interrelations
between the various underlining components.24 We have conducted several refinements to the
standard procedure in order to avoid several of its alleged shortcomings.25
[TABLE 1]
The results obtained from the application of this methodology are presented in Table 1
above. All variables under study have positive weightings in the first component. Finally, the
IMD index has been obtained as a linear combination of each of these variables, in which the
values assigned by factorial analysis to each component as a proportion of their total value are
used as their respective weightings.26
[FIGURE 6]
The evolution of IMD (Figure 6) shows a significant increase up to 1947 where it
stayed in a high plateau until a gradual decline started in 1951 and was sustained during the
1950s. Only an episodic reversal took place in 1956, associated to populist policies
24 Some critics stress that the PCA fails to reflect a conceptual link between the theory behind the
choice of elements and the index itself. Others observe that the results are sensitive to the scale of
measurement of the different variables under consideration and highlight the ambiguity involved in the
interpretation of the results. Finally, it is argued that this methodology assigns lower weights to
variables which are highly correlated with others (Heckelman and Stroup, 2005, p. 957). It should be
noted, however, that in this particular case the problems derived from applying this methodology
appear to be minor.
25 Firstly, our weights do not contradict any underlining economic theory because, to our knowledge, a
model for the construction of this type of indices is not available. Secondly, all variables to be used in
the index have been standardized to minimizing their sensitivity to the scale of measurement.
Additionally, in order to avoid ambiguity in the interpretation of the obtained results, we have checked
the relative importance of each variable during each period of time. Finally, we have addressed the
high correlation between the variables by considering their correlation matrix (available, upon request,
from the authors). A direct observation of this matrix shows that the correlations are high enough to
justify the use of principal component methodology but not high enough to generate distortions in the
assignation of weights to different variables.
26 These weightings are: 0.615 for Government Consumption relative to total consumption; 0.723 for
currency depreciation; and 0.784 for Black Market.
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implemented by Franco’s Minister of Labour which led to a substantial pay rise across the
board in 1956 and a subsequent inflation upsurge (Barciela 2002). Then, the IMD remained
stable at low values until it rose again after the 1973 oil shock.
[TABLE 2]
Table 2 reviews the impact (measured as changes in one standard deviation) of its
different components on IMD. The depreciation of the currency was the most important
variable over the entire period, except during the early Franco’s period (1939-1951) in which
the ‘black market’ premium prevailed. The fact that the currency depreciation and ‘black
market’ appear as the main explanatory variables matches the results obtained through PCA
(Table 1). where they exhibit the largest weights.
Assessing the impact of IMD on growth
The next issue is how to estimate the effect of IMD on real GDP levels, which we
hypothesize negative. More specifically, our starting point is a conventional augmented-
Solow model á la Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) in which GDP (in logs) is dependent on
the log of the quantity of labour (number of hours worked) (hereafter LAB). the rate of
investment (the ratio of gross capital formation to GDP at current prices, INVT). the quality
of labour (improvements in labour’s skills as a measure of human capital, HK, in logs). and
the log of total factor productivity (TFP).27 The GDP is not fully defined because we do not
include land in our calculations and TFP is not a combination of the INVT, HK and LAB
variables. 28
(1) log GDP = a0 + a1 log LAB + a2 log INVT + a3 log HK+ a4 log TFP +ε
Our hypothesis is that macroeconomic distortions, as measured by IMD, decreased
efficiency gains and disrupted capital accumulation. For this reason, TFP, HK, and INVT
have been endogeneized in order to take into account the impact macroeconomic distortions
have on them and to allow for additional exogenous variables. However, we have not follow
27 Other studies show that per capita income differences across countries are explained taking account
differences in capital endowments and TFP (Hall and Jones, 1999; Parente and Prescott, 2000;
Easterly and Levine, 2003). The sources for the data used in this section are detailed in Appendix 1.
28 TFP is drawn from growth accounting estimates in Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2009). See
Appendix 1.
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the same procedure with LAB because we assume that this is mainly driven by exogenous
demographic forces and unexpected shocks such as wars and epidemics (which are
independent from macroeconomic policies).
There are several channels through which macroeconomic policy may have affect
TFP growth, because this is the result of both efficiency gains and technological changes
(Harberger 1998).29 We postulate that TFP (in logs) depends on IMD, the degree of openness
(measured as the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, OPEN, 30 in logs) and previous levels
of human capital and GDP, which are proxies for the actual technological capability.
(2) log TFP = b0 + b1 IMD + b2 log OPEN + b3 log HK + b4 log GDP + ε
In order to explaining investment rates we have related the share of capital formation
in GDP to the relative price of capital, the degree of financial development, the level of GDP,
and the degree of income inequality. Thus, the rate of capital accumulation has been
associated the relative price of capital goods (Taylor 1998). Here, instead of the relative price
of capital goods, we employ the user cost of capital, since it is a more accurate measure as
includes the price of capital goods, the interest rate, and the depreciation rate, relative to the
consumption deflator (hereafter, RUCK). In addition, we expect financial development
(measured as M3 over GDP, DEPTH, thereafter) to encourage, ceteris paribus, investment.
There are competing views as regards the role of inequality in capital accumulation: on the
one hand, the negative connection between inequality and investment, as a result of social
instability, has been stressed by, for example, Alesina and Perotti (1996) but, on the other
hand, a positive link associating, at low levels of per capita income, inequality to increasing
saving and investment has been claimed (Kaldor 1955-6). We employ the Gini coefficient as
29 Particularly, orthodox macroeconomic policy may stimulate inventive activity because the amount
of domestic R&D decreases as uncertainty about their benefits increase (Jaumotte and Pain 2005).
30 Anti-trade policies decrease TFP as international trade is a significant carrier of R&D knowledge
(Coe and Helpman 1995, Madsen 2007). Similarly, policies limiting, or impeding, FDI investment
may also damage TFP gains given that multinationals transfer knowledge from “parents” to their
foreign affiliates and sometimes some of this knowledge “spills over” to domestic firms in the host
country through non-market transactions (Haskel et al. 2007). In consequence, we introduce OPEN as
a control variable because some changes in trade policy (like modifications in quotas) could not well
captured by our IMD variable.
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our income inequality measure (GINI, hereafter). Specifically, the share of investment in GDP
(INVT) is related to (the logs of) RUCK, DEPTH, GDP, and GINI.
(3) log INVT = c0 + c1 log RUCK + c2 log DEPTH + c3 log GDP + c4 log GINI + ε
Furthermore, it should be taken into account that price distortions play a prominent
role in explaining the relative price of capital goods (Jones 1994, Collins and Williamson
2001, Eaton and Kortum 2001, Restuccia and Urrutia 2001). For this reasons, the relative user
cost of capital (RUCK) is assumed to depend on IMD and also on GDP level.
(4) log RUCK = d0 + d1 IMD + c2 log GDP +ε
Lastly, the quality of labour, or human capital, depends on the level of development (GDP)
and past levels of TFP.31
(5) log HK = e0 + e1 GDP + e2 log TFP +ε
To investigate the relationship between IMD and GDP more in depth, we construct a
structural model as a system of simultaneous equations (Equations 1 to 5).32 In the estimation
we have employed Three Stages Least Squares (3SLS) that solves the problem of
contemporary correlation between the equations’ residuals and deals with the endogeneity
problem often present in this kind of exercises. The results are presented in Table 3.
[TABLE 3]
The results are in line with our previous predictions. Not surprisingly, we found that
IMD had a negative impact in GDP levels channelled through factor accumulation (via the
relative price user cost of capital) and TFP levels. Also, all variables have the expected sign at
the conventional levels of significance. Now, we will proceed to discuss in detail the results
from equations 2 to 5, which investigate the relation between IMD and the underlining
determinants of GDP.
To investigate whether IMD affects GDP via lower TFP, we have to take a closer look
at equation (2) of our model. A lower degree of macroeconomic distortions, a higher degree
31 Cervellati and Sunde (2005) have shown that this relation exists.
32 All econometric development is detailed at the appendix 2.
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of openness and a higher level of human capital and GDP in previous periods guarantee a
higher TFP level.
Equations 3 and 4 analyses the impact of distortions in physical capital investment.
We found that IMD influenced positively RUCK which, in turn, influenced negatively
investment. In other words, macroeconomic distortions reduced investment by increasing the
user cost of capital (note that the partial elasticity of RUCK with respect of IMD is 0.18).
Results from Equation 3 lend support to the view that attributes lower rates of capital
accumulation to higher RUCK. The estimates also suggest that degree of financial
development (DEPTH). inequality (GINI). and the level of GDP are associated to an increase
of INVT. Why inequality is associated to a higher rate of capital accumulation deserves
further research. In sum, investment is negatively correlated with distorting policies and
positively correlated with inequality and financial development.
Lastly, equation 5 discusses the underlining determinants of human capital levels. In
this occasion, no clear-cut evidence of IMD impact on human capital (HK) seems to exist
since it is determined by GDP and TFP levels. However, as discussed earlier, IMD may
influence indirectly HK by reducing both, TFP and GDP levels.
Assessing the Impact of the Stabilization and Liberalization Plan
The estimated coefficients in Table 3 together with the values of each variable may be
used to explore some counterfactual alternatives.33 Our goal is assessing the economic impact
of macroeconomic distortions, as measured by IMD, during the early phase of dictatorship
(1939-1959). as a way of highlighting the change brought about to the Spanish economy by
the 1959 Liberalization and Stabilization Plan.
We propose three counterfactual hypotheses (Table 4). Firstly, we consider a
hypothetical situation in which the average value of IMD during 1939-51 would have been
maintained over 1952-75 (Scenario I). This is an extreme situation that simulates a Spain
ruled by the autarchic élite throughout the entire Franco regime. Then, a less astringent
assumption is made in Scenario II: the IMD average value over 1952-58 would have
remained in place until 1975. This seems to be a more plausible scenario in case Franco and
his closest advisers had rejected the advice of the reformists and their international allies in
the desperate conjuncture of lack foreign reserves Spain faced in 1959. Finally, Scenario III
33 Carreras (1982, 1992) and Martín Aceña (2004) have investigated a counterfactual scenario but they
did not carry out any formal estimation of the impact of Franco’s economic policies.
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simulates how would have the Spanish economy performed without the significant
macroeconomic distortions which suffered over 1939-1958, and, therefore, the IMD would
have been similar to its actual average over 1959-75. The latter mimics a non-Francoist Spain,
that is, another Western European country under the pro-market influence of the Marshall
Plan, such as Italy. We expect that in Scenarios I and II values are lower than the actual while
in Scenario III should be higher than those observed.
[TABLE 4]
[FIGURE 7]
The results of these counterfactual exercises, summarized in Table 4 and Figure7, lend
strong support to the hypothesis that macroeconomic policy conducted during the early
Franco’s regime damaged dramatically the Spanish economy. For each variable, per capita
and absolute GDP, human capital, investment and TFP, the impact of Franco’s economic
policy was damaging. More prominently, the major channel by which IMD costs economic
growth is through TFP growth. In other words, bad policies translated into lower TFP growth.
However, non-negligible differences are observed between the hypothetical results
cast by Scenarios I and II. To be more precise, in Scenario I, real GDP per head would have
grown, over 1959-75, at a rate 58 percent lower than the actual one, while under Scenario II it
would have been only 18 percent lower. For the entire period, 1939-75, they would have been
33 and 11 percent lower, respectively. Such a result is confirmed by Scenario III which casts
growth rates 63 and 21 percent higher for 1939-51 and 1952-58, respectively, under the
hypothetical proposition of much lower macroeconomic distortions.
These results tend to contradict the conventional view of a homogeneous autarchic era
covering the first two decades of Franco’s dictatorship and portray the 1959 Stabilization and
Liberalization Plan as a major discontinuity between two opposite worlds. Without
challenging the significance of the 1959 Plan for sustained growth and catching up during
Spain’s delayed Golden Age (1960-75). our results stress that the gradual liberalization
occurred during the 1950s allowed the economy to improve its performance substantially and
depicts the 1959 structural reforms as the response to a growth crisis. In other words, as in
other historical experiences (i.e. Latin America over 1940-80) inward-looking policies did not
preclude growth in Spain but set limits to its sustainability over the long run.
[TABLE 5]
What would have been, then, Spain’s relative position at the end of Franco’s
dictatorship had pre-1959 macroeconomic distortions remained in place? In Table 5 levels of
GDP per head in 1975 for actual and counterfactual Spain (resulting from Scenarios I and II)
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are compared to those in OECD, Central and Eastern Europe, and Latin America. Spain,
already at the bottom of Western Europe, would have fallen further down: below Argentina,
Greece, Czechoslovakia, and Ireland in the relatively benign Scenario II, and below Portugal,
Bulgaria, Poland, and Hungary, and close to Uruguay and Mexico, in Scenario I. When
Spain’s performance relative to Western Europe’s is considered, it appears that while actual
Spain recovered her relative position in 1958 by 1962, counterfactual Spain would have had
to wait until 1966 to do it (Scenario II) or would have remained below the 1950s level until
1974 (Scenario I).
Concluding remarks
This paper has analysed the impact of different Franco’s economic policies on Spanish
economic growth and, in particular, the consequences of Stabilization and Liberalization Plan
of 1959. During the early years of Franco’s dictatorship, the new regime introduced a set of
anti-market policies that altered dramatically previous economic policy. These new measures
resulted in high inflation rates, the development of ‘black’ markets, and a contraction in
international trade. During the 1950s successive pro-market changes in economic policy were
introduced which implied that the most extreme interventionist policies were relaxed while
the Spanish economy benefited from a cooperation agreement with the US government. By
the end of the decade, a new step towards liberalization was taken with the adoption of a
stabilization plan in 1959. Spain entered into major international organizations, which
increasingly committed Spanish government to free-market discipline. Moreover, Franco’s
Regime offered a precedent of responsible behaviour to domestic and foreign investors by
implementing a sound macroeconomic policy. As a consequence, inflation decreased, ‘black
markets’ disappeared, foreign investment increased, and international trade flourished.
The important role played by the economic policy reforms conducted during the
1950s, particularly the Liberalization and Stabilization Plan of 1959, in promoting sustained
economic growth is confirmed by our results. A gradual reduction of macroeconomic
distortions in the 1950s explains economic growth during this decade. The 1959 Plan, which
appears as a response to an inward-looking growth crisis, gave way to a new institutional set
which favoured the allocation of resources along comparative advantage and allowed
sustained and faster growth, as well as catching up. Without the Stabilization and
Liberalization Plan, GDP would have been significantly lower at the time of Franco’s death,
in 1975. However, there is a significant difference in outcomes depending on whether pre-
1951 macroeconomic economic distortions had remained in place (that is, no economic
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reform took place). or if only the 1959 Plan would have not been implemented and the 1950s
restrictions persisted. In fact, by 1975, GDP would have represented two-thirds of its actual
level in the first scenario, but only 85 percent, in the second. In other words, the previous
reforms of the 1950s appear as a far from negligible prerequisite for implementing the
stabilization plan in 1959.
Several broad lessons could be derived from this historical investigation. First, we
have shown the advantages of case studies and the usefulness of our index of macroeconomic
distortions, assembled with the principal components method and comprising government
consumption, currency depreciation and ‘black market’ premium, in assessing the impact of
economic policies on economic performance. Second, we confirm that successful stabilization
programs are possible under authoritarian political regimes. Third, we have shown that major
economic reforms are successful when come after a period of initial reforms and economic
growth. It seems unlikely that the Stabilization Plan of 1959 had succeeded without previous
policy reforms and economic growth. In this regard it is worth to notice interesting
similarities between 1959 Stabilization and the Marshall Plan. In both cases their success
depended on the fact that the countries involved were growing already and whose
governments opened up their economies reassuring economic agents about their commitment
to free markets and international integration (De Long and Eichengreen (1991). Lastly, our
investigation also suggests that a detailed analysis is needed of the various channels through
which the dictatorship could impact on economic growth.
No simple analogy can be easily drawn, however, between Spain’s historical
experience and the expected outcomes of similar reforms in today’s developing countries. The
main lesson is, perhaps, that the economic results of any major stabilization program depend,
to a large extent, on its historical context. Several particular historical circumstances eased the
Spanish economic reforms. The Cold War allowed the co-existence of a dictatorial regime in
Western Europe with a market-oriented and internationally integrated economy. In particular,
the international political situation made easier for the Regime to get foreign economic
assistance and substantial loans to finance its economic reforms. The same nature of the
Bretton Woods system, which restricted speculative capital movements, also helped the
reform process. A new technology with large potential TFP gains, the mass production, was
already available. Finally, its geographical situation facilitated Spain’s integration into the
international economy.
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Table 1
Principal Components Analysis to Derive the Index of Macroeconomic Distortions
Government Consumption Currency Depreciation ‘Black Market’
Premium
Factor 1 0.615 0.723 0.784
Sources: See the text.
Table 2
Impact of Different Variables over the IMD
Government
Consumption
Currency
Depreciation
‘Black Market’
Premium
1939-1951 0.517 0.338 0.987
1952-1958 0.082 0.312 0.170
1959-1975 0.140 0.218 0.078
Sources: See the text.
Notes: Impact is measured as the one resulting from a standard deviation change.
The equation that relates the IMD index and its components exhibits the following coefficients: 7.237,
depreciation of the currency; -2.879, Government Consumption; 0.029, ‘black market’ premium.
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Table 3
Econometric Model: Structural Estimation
Dependent Variable GDP
(Equation 1)
TFP
(Equation 2)
INVT
(Equation 3)
RUCK
(Equation 4)
HK
(Equation 5)
Constant -8.527
(-9.349)
2.585
(13.644)
3.332
(21.619)
INVT (-1) 0.0078
(2.975)
TFP (-3) 0.936
(13.626)
TFP (-10) 0.158
(3.679)
LAB 1.331
(13.670)
HK 0.598
(1.878)
HK (-6) 0.709
(26.337)
RUCK -3.117
(-3.546)
DEPTH 4.689
(6.249)
GINI 6.058
(3.142)
GDP 6.436
(9.968)
0.271
(7.782)
0.107
(10.649)
GDP (-1) 0.323
(20.728)
IMD (-1) 0.179
(7.088)
IMD (-3) -0.060
(-4.526)
OPEN 0.068
(2.069)
Adjusted R2 0.990 0.936 0.769 0.567 0.947
Sources: Appendix 1.
Notes: Method 3SLS; t-ratios in brackets; the number of lags appears in brackets.
GDP, TFP, HK, OPEN, LAB and RUCK are in logs. Instrumental variables are:
Equation (1): constant, INVT (-2). TFP (-2). TFP (-3). LAB (-1). RUCK, IMD, OPEN, OPEN (-1)
OPEN (-2) and HK.
Equation (2): constant, LAB(-1). HK(-1). GDP(-2). OPEN(-2). OPEN(-3). CIM(-1). CIM, contract-
intensive money, [M2-C)/M2], C being currency outside banks See Clague et al. (1999). INTEREST,
real interest rate.
Equation (3): constant, INTEREST (-1). INTEREST (-3). IMD, IMD (-1). DEPTH, OPEN (-1). OPEN
(-2). GDP (-1). GDP (-2).
Equation (4): constant, IMD (-2). IMD (-3). OPEN (-4). GDP (-1).
Equation (5): constant, GDP (-1). GDP (-2). TFP (-1). TFP (-2). TFP (-3). IMD,
IMD (-1). OPEN, OPEN (-1).
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Table 4
Growth in Actual and Counterfactual Economic Policy Scenarios
1939-51 1952-58 1959-75 1939-58 1939-75
Per Capita GDP Growth (%)
Actual 2.1 4.4 5.6 2.9 4.2
Scenario I 4.2 3.1 3.0
Scenario II 4.7 3.8
Scenario III 3.9 5.4 4.5
GDP Growth (%)
Actual 2.9 5.2 6.7 3.7 5.1
Scenario I 5.1 4.2 3.9
Scenario II 5.7 4.7
Scenario III 4.7 6.2 5.3
Investment (% GDP)
Actual 14.7 21.3 24.1 17.2 20.4
Scenario I 16.9 20.6 17.9
Scenario II 21.9 19.4
Scenario III 16.5 20.2 17.9
Human Capital Growth (%)
Actual -0.6 1.3 1.2 0.1 0.6
Scenario I 1.1 0.7 0.3
Scenario II 0.9 0.5
Scenario III 0.3 1.3 0.6
TFP Growth (%)
Actual 1.2 2.7 4.1 1.7 2.9
Scenario I 1.5 2.2 1.7
Scenario II 3.0 2.3
Scenario III 2.2 3.4 2.6
Sources: Computed with parameters from Table 4. See the text and Appendix 1.
Notes: Scenario I: assumes 1939-51 IMD average value was maintained over 1952-75; Scenario II:
assumes 1952-58 IMD average value was maintained over 1952-75; Scenario III: assumes 1959-75
IMD average value was maintained over 1939-58.
28
Table 5
Spain’s Relative Per Capita GDP in 1975 (1990 Geary-Khamis $)
United States 16284
Western Europe (12) 12228
Italy 10742
Venezuela 10472
Spain (actual) 8357
Argentina 8122
Greece 7722
Czechoslovakia 7399
Ireland 7316
Spain (Scenario II) 7121
Portugal 6517
Bulgaria 5831
Poland 5808
Hungary 5805
Spain (Scenario I) 5441
Uruguay 5421
Mexico 5158
Yugoslavia 4836
Peru 4326
Sources: Maddison (2009) except Spain (see text).
Note: Western Europe (12) is a population weighted average of Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and United
Kingdom
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Figure 1 Real Per Capita GDP, 1850-2000 (000 Pesetas) (2000 prices)
Sources: Prados de la Escosura (2003, updated).
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Figure 2 Government Consumption Share of Total Consumption, 1939-75
Sources: Prados de la Escosura (2003) and see the text.
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Figure 3 Depreciation of the Currency, 1939-75
Sources: Prados de la Escosura (2003) and see the text.
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Sources: Prados de la Escosura (2003).
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Figure 5 “Black Market” Premium 1939-75: Trade-Weighted and Unweighted
Sources: Martínez Ruiz (2003). Martín Aceña and Pons (2005). Serrano Sanz and
Asensio Castillo (1997) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004).
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Figure 6. Index of Macroeconomic Distortions (IMD). 1939-75
Sources: See Appendix 1 and the text.
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Figure 7 Spain’s Relative Per Capita GDP: Actual and Counterfactual, 1939-75
(Western Europe 12 = 1)
Sources: See the text.
Notes: Western Europe (12) is a population weighted average of Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.
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Appendix 1: Data sources
GDP: United States and Western Europe, Maddison (2009); Spain, Prados de la Escosura (2003,
updated).
Inflation rate (GDP implicit deflator): Prados de la Escosura (2003). table A.13.6.
‘Black market’ premium: Martínez Ruiz (2003). Serrano Sanz and Asensio Castillo (1997). Reinhart
and Rogoff (2004). Martín Aceña and Pons (2005). table 9.17.
Share of Government Consumption in total Consumption: Government and Domestic
Consumption are drawn from Prados de la Escosura (2003). table A.6.8.
Investment rate: Prados de la Escosura (2003). table A.12.3.
TFP (Total factor productivity): Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2009). underlying data.
LAB (labour) and HK (labour quality): Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2010b). underlying data.
OPEN (openness): Computed as Exports plus Imports divided by GDP with data drawn from Prados
de la Escosura (2003. table A.13.1.
RUCK (relative user’s cost of capital): Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2009). underlying data, and
Prados de la Escosura (2003).
INTEREST (interest rate): Martín Aceña and Pons (2005). table 9.17.
CIM (contract-intensive money): Computed as (M2-Cash)/M2 with data drawn from Martín Aceña
and Pons (2005).
Appendix 2: Econometric Basis for Structural Model
We develop a set of econometric tests over our data before to proceed with estimation of
equations 1 to 5 (model of table 3). Our initial empirical goal is to find a stable long run relationship
between each pair of relevant variables which will permit us to test for causality. First, we investigate
the order of integration of different variables (see Table A.1).
[TABLE A.1]
Due to the fact that all these variables are integrated of order one, we test the null hypothesis
that there is a co-integration relation between IMD and RUCK, RUCK and INVT, IMD and TFP. The
results obtained are presented in Table A.2
[TABLE A.2]
A co-integration relationship has been found between these four pairs of variables, each of
these have a common trend and, hence, a stable short-run relationship. IMD is affecting positively
RUCK, which in turn affects negatively INVT, and negatively to TFP and GDP (as we have predicted
earlier). These results lead us to develop a Granger causality test between each variable pair using the
residuals from the estimation of the long-run equilibrium relationship.
[TABLE A.3]
33
Granger causality tests of Table A.3 suggest causality from IMD to RUCK rather than the
other way round. Appling a similar approach, we also find that IMD Granger-causes TFP. Therefore,
after conducting these co-integration and Granger tests, we are able to confirm that the IMD is behind
RUCK and TFP.
Table A1
Variables in the Structural Model: Order of Integration
Variables
(logs)
ADF Test
Level
ADF Test
First Differences
Order of
Integration
GDP 1.299 -9.333 I(1)
INVT -2.292 -8.881 I(1)
TFP -0.477 -3.233 I(1)
LAB -2.215 -9.792 I(1)
IMD -1.047 -14.520 I(1)
OPEN -1.815 -10.555 I(1)
RUCK -1.845 -12.014 I(1)
HK 0.144 -17.387 I(1)
GINI -2.463 -13.353 I(1)
DEPTH -2.452 -13.353 I(1)
Sources: See the text.
Notes: All the variables are expressed in logs except INVT and IMD. The ADF level tests have been
considered with constant and trend in all cases except for RUCK and IMD which have been considered
with only constant and without constant and trend respectively. The level of significance is in all cases
at 1%, except for TFP which is at 10%
Table A.2
Long-run Relationship between Variable Pairs
Pairs of Variables
ADF Test
over the residuals of the
Long-run Relationship
IMD and RUCK -4.22**
IMD and TFP -2.48**
RUCK and INVT -3.420***
Sources: See the text.
Notes: All the variables are expressed in logs except INVT and IMD
The ADF level tests have been considered with constant and trend in all cases except for the
relationship between IMD and TFP which have been considered without constant and without trend.
The level of significance is at 5% (**) and at 10% (***).
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Table A.3
Granger Causality between IMD, RUCK, and TFP
Pairwise Granger Causality test
Null Hypothesis: F-statistic Chi-square
Row 1 IMD does not Granger cause RUCK
RUCK does not Granger cause IMD
6.39
2.91
12.79
5.81
Row 2 RUCK does not Granger cause INVT
INVT does not Granger cause RUCK
5.89
3.09
17.67
9.28
Row 3 IMD does not Granger cause TFP
TFP does not Granger cause IMD
6.09
0.79
18.27
2.37
Sources: See the text.
Note: The critical values are 2.29 for F-statistic and 11.07 for Chi-square.
